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Abstract
The period since the independence of the Republic of Macedonia in 1991 has shown the political importance of language,
as well as the political tensions that can arise over language-related issues. For a long time, multilingualism in Macedonia
was a problem that threatened the unity and stability of the country. In 2001 the armed conflict inMacedonia showed that
governmental policies of ignoring certain issues fueled ethnic divisions and facilitated a climate of insecurity. In order to
terminate the armed conflict, Macedonia has since introduced constitutional changes relevant to linguistic diversity. The
constitutional amendment regulating the official use of languages in Macedonia was as a result of a necessary compro-
mise to terminate the armed conflict. The amendment is formulated in a vague and contradictorymanner; full of loopholes,
views provided on official languages leads to different interpretations and is still subject to disputes between experts, as
well as party leaders in Macedonia. This vagueness led to politicians using the topic of the official use of languages as a
talking point in every electoral campaign since 2001. This article will examine the challenges and possibilities that came
from the constitutional amendment on the use of languages in Macedonia. It will also analyze the loopholes of the legal
norms on the use of languages, and the problems of its implementation.
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1. Introduction
Ethnic questions have been part of the central issue of
politics in Macedonia since its independence in 1991. As
is the case with other Balkan states, Macedonia has had
difficulties in learning that “the failure to carefully pro-
tect the rights of minority groups greatly jeopardizes the
integrity of the state and the stability of the democratic
processes” (Kolarova, 1993, p. 23).
Macedonia struggled with the challenge to grant eth-
nic rights, and to preserve state sovereignty and territo-
rial integrity. The reconciliation of these “divergent ob-
jectives is imperative to resolving tension between mi-
norities and majorities in [the] state-centered world we
live in” (Porter, 2003, p. 53).
The ethnic issues have been a major point of friction
in Macedonia due to the belief that “[r]ecognition, pro-
tection and promotion of minority rights is more than
symbolism, as it alters the inherent social, economic and
political relations of power between themajority andmi-
norities,” prevailed in the political discourse (Tully, 2001,
p. 15). In Macedonia, the conflict betweenMacedonians
and Albanians “has tended to focus on the legal and po-
litical status of the Albanian population and on the po-
litical and cultural character of the Macedonian state”
(Engström, 2002, p. 6). There was a dominant fear that
the granting of ethnic rights would change the status of
Albanians and could threaten the unity and stability of
the country.
In the debates over ethnic issues in Macedonia, lin-
guistic rights of ethnic communities have taken a central
part. The issue of language is very important because:
The language is often central to feelings of community
and culture, of tradition and ‘belonging’ which makes
any menace, disrespect or attack on its use or exis-
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tence capable of arousing strong emotions and poten-
tial cause of a conflict. (De Varennes, 1997, p. 138)
Thus, language is “a marker of membership in commu-
nity” and “a possible red flag for intolerance and discrim-
ination”. (De Varennes, 1997, p. 138).
However, the psychological effects that language poli-
cies have upon individuals should not be minimized. The
language is intimately associated with the individual, and:
Language is a particularly easy tool to use in political
control. Therefore, when language policies establish
boundaries between people and government the ef-
fects are likely to be quite significant: alienation, dis-
tancing and political impotence. (Perea, 1992, p. 335)
Thus, proper regulation of the use of languages has af-
fects not only on the boundaries between people and
governments, but also on the relations between people
of different languages:
Achieving harmony and peace among peoples of dif-
ferent languages and cultures has depended on mak-
ing all peoples feel that they are part of a given po-
litical entity, that their existence is not threatened.
(Kibbee, 2008, p. 79)
There is no doubt that accommodating multilingualism
should be a question of highest political importance in
every country today. This issue is an important task for
constitutional designers, because:
The failure to manage linguistic conflict through con-
stitutional design has the potential to lead to an esca-
lating set of demands—for official-language status in
shared institutions, to territorial autonomy, and ulti-
mately, to secession. (Choudhry, 2009, p. 578)
2. Official Language—No Single Definition
In contrast to religion, the state cannot be neutral in
choosing the official language. The constitutional design-
ers solve this question in different ways: by choosing one
official language; by choosing several official languages
with equal scope of use; by giving to some minority lan-
guages partial official status in somedomains on national
level and in some smaller territorial units; or, by giving
some minority languages official status on local level.
However, there is no universal definition of what an offi-
cial language means.
The official use of language of the majority is self-
implied because the “state functions may be exercised
most efficiently by using the language known to the
greatest percentage of the population in a country”, but
it does not “indicate that establishing the official lan-
guage (official languages) of a country is considered as
an issue of a mere technical or practical relevance” (Ko-
rhecz, 2008, p. 460).
The decision of which language becomes the official
language of the state hasmuch to dowith the power per-
spective. In nation states, a:
Language of the group in power, became the dominat-
ing paradigm for communication with and within the
state guaranteeing that specific groups dominating
the language of the nation state formation could take
control of the state’s governance structures. (Marácz,
2014, p. 46)
Marácz explains that the power element is always
present in the relationship between majority and minor-
ity languages and cases of “linguistic hegemony andmul-
tilingual communication that result in far more compli-
cated linguistic and communicational patterns [that] trig-
ger conflicts” which are essentially political.
The language groups not controlling the state lan-
guage are excluded from power and the groups being
excluded from power are struggling for recognition in
order to get access to the power structure of the state
in their first language. (Marácz, 2014, p. 46)
In addition to this struggle is the recognition that “lan-
guage policies are never exclusively about language and
are often understood as embedded in wider social, po-
litical and economic contexts” (Zappettini & Comanaru,
2014, p. 403) and “language use is an element central
to constructing domination in organizational settings”
(Wodak, Krzyźanowski, & Forchtner, 2012, p. 158). This
will be shown in the Macedonian case of accommoda-
tion of multilingualism.
In many countries, there are varying degrees of of-
ficial use of some minority languages, and the minority
language can often be used as the official language in dis-
tinct institutional contexts. Alan Patten andWill Kymlicka
(2003) provide a useful taxonomy of the distinct institu-
tional contexts in which the choice of official language
must be made. The states must choose an official lan-
guage for legislatures, courts, and the executive. Further
distinctions can bemade within each of these categories.
A further distinction can be drawn between the internal
language of government and the language of public ser-
vices (e.g., education); between procedure in the legisla-
ture and in its committees; or the manner of use of mi-
nority language in judicial procedures.
Several factors influence the degree of the official use
of minority languages, as do:
The number and territorial concentration of indi-
viduals belonging to a particular linguistic minority,
the status of the minority language historically, long
standing ties of a linguistic minority and a particu-
lar territory (autochthonous character), the influence
and pressure imposed by the kin-state to achieve
recognition of the official use of particular minority
language, political influence of the minority itself de-
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manding to achieve official status of its language, and
the expressed demand and need of speakers to use
the minority language, etc. (Korhecz, 2008, p. 464)
All of these factors have influenced the promotion of the
official use of the Albanian language in Macedonia. The
analysis of the official use of minority languages inMace-
donia will also confirm Grin’s statement that despite the
constitutional positioning of the minority language as of-
ficial, three conditions must be met for members of lan-
guage minorities to use their language. These conditions
are: capacity, opportunity, and desire (or willingness)
(Grin, 2003, pp. 43–44). As minority language-speakers
are typically bilingual, people’s willingness to use their
language depends, among other things, on whether they
perceive their language as the most appropriate one to
use within a certain institution. “If that is not the case,
even the highest level of regional or minority language
protection and promotion in the ‘legal’ domain would
then fail to prove effective” (Cardi, 2007, p. 21).
3. Ethnic Structure and Political Context in Macedonia
Analysis of the accommodation of multilingualism in
Macedonia will consider the “law in context” approach.
Themethodology thatwill be followed refers to public pol-
icy analysis. The legal and institutional framework of the
use of languages will be analyzed. Then, the implemen-
tation of the language regime’s legal framework will be
evaluated and possible policy actions will be considered.
Themost recent official numerical data for the ethnic
structure of the country are from the last census, held
in 2002. Another census was planned for 2011. Parlia-
ment adopted the law regulating the tasks of the bodies
that were supposed to carry the census, the surveying
methodology, etc. The Government appointed twenty-
fivemembers of the State Census Commission (SCC). The
census started, but four days before the census deadline,
all members of the SCC had filed irrevocable resignations,
suspending all of its activities because “there are no basic
preconditions for continuation of the census”, as it “can-
not provide relevant data” (Marusic, 2011).
The ethnic Macedonian and Albanian members in-
side the SCC could not agree on someof the basic rules of
the census, and announced that the census had been sus-
pended because different field interpretations of the sur-
veying methodology could not guarantee reliable data
(Karajkov, 2011). The difference in the interpretation of
the surveying methodology actually influenced the num-
bers within the ethnic structure of the country.
SomeAlbanianmembers are thought to have counted
people who had been living abroad for more than a
year, as well as accepting photocopies of ID cards as
a basis for data. Macedonian members were strongly
against this. (Marusic, 2011)
It was clear that the dispute in SCC was ethnically and
politically driven, and was not a “scientific” dispute over
methodology. In every state the results of the census
are the basis for the formation of reforms, road maps,
agenda setting and decision making. Moreover, in the
case of Macedonia, it was not just a conflict, but also
an attempt to manipulate the future agenda. The SCC
was not only appointed but also controlled by the Gov-
ernment, i.e., the ruling coalition. The SCC’s members
that were from DUI—the ruling political party that rep-
resented Albanians in Macedonia at the time, chose a
methodology that made it possible to strengthen their
group representation numerically. The SCC’s members
thatwere fromVMRO-DPMNE—the ruling party that rep-
resented Macedonians, opposed the strategy of DUI. So,
the coalition partners in the government decided to “kill
the census” in order to give the chance for “the ruling
coalition to survive” and continue to lead the govern-
ment. The resignation of the SCC, supported by method-
ological explanation, was used as a solution.
According to data from 2002, Macedonia is a coun-
try in which Macedonians make up the majority of the
population (64.18%). The largest minority group is Alba-
nian (25.17%). There are several other minority groups
living in Macedonia, all of which are smaller (the second
minority group is Turkish, with 3.85% of total population)
(see Table 1).
The ethnic structure in Macedonia is reflected in
its linguistic diversity. The Macedonian language is the
mother tongue to 66.49% of the population; the Alba-
nian language is the mother tongue to 25.12%; Turkish
language to 3.55%; Roma language to 1.91%; Serbian lan-
guage to 1.22%; Bosnian language to 0.42%; Vlach lan-
guage to 0.34%; and some other languages are mother
tongues to 0.95% of the population.
Most of the ethnic Albanians are compactly settled
in the western part of the country in an almost contin-
uous strip along the Macedonian border with Albania
and Kosovo, and in some villages near Skopje. From a
total of 85 municipalities plus the city of Skopje, Alba-
nians are the majority population in 16 municipalities
(from which five are urban and 11 rural) and in 13 units
of local self-government, consisting of more than 20% of
the population.
Table 1. Population structure according to national affiliation in 2002 census.
Macedonians Albanians Turkish Roma Vlachs Serbs Bosnians Others
1297981 509,083 77,959 53,879 9,695 35,939 17,018 20,993
64.18% 25.17% 3.85% 2.66% 0.48% 1.78% 0.84% 1.04%
Source: State Statistical Office of the Republic of Macedonia (2002, p. 194).
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Other minorities are not compactly settled, with few
exceptions. Turks are the majority in two municipalities
and consist of more than 20% of the population in two
other municipalities. Romas are in the majority in one
municipality, and Serbsmake over 20% of the population
in one rural municipality. What we have inMacedonia to-
day “is continued contact and mutual influence among
local languages at local levels” (Friedman, 2012, p. 121).
The Albanians are backed by their kin-state, and this
has contributed to a divisive ethnic situation. The influ-
ence of the proximity of a kin-state to the readiness
of the ethnic communities to demand respect of their
rights is already recognized in the existing analysis (De
Varennes, 1997, p. 160). But in Macedonia, the proxim-
ity of a kin-state of Albanians togetherwith the territorial
concentration andnumber of Albanians inMacedonia, as
well as the fight for the independence of Kosovo, raised
the fears of the existence of a “hidden agenda for [the]
creation of Great Albania” and concerns about the unity
of Macedonia.
These fears were fueled by the separatist demands
of some Albanian political leaders in the beginning of
the transition. Other Albanian political leaders have not
addressed the assumptions that they intend to pursue
a separatist policy to de-escalate the situation that con-
tributed to inter-ethnic frictions and distrust.
Insecurity and desperation for survival of the Mace-
donian nation as an independent state in a “hostile neigh-
borhood” also “fueled” the inter-ethnic relations. Since
independence, the existence of a Macedonian nation,
language, state and church has been denied by neighbor-
ing countries: Bulgaria does not accept the existence of
theMacedonian language; the Serbian Orthodox Church
does not accept the autonomy of the Macedonian Or-
thodox Church; Greece disputes the right of the coun-
try to use its constitutional name and delays or ob-
jects to the integration of the country into the interna-
tional community.
In such political circumstances, Macedonian govern-
ments have been among those governments in Eastern
Europe and Central Asia for which “language and ethnic
diversity are, if not a threat to national unity, at least an
inconvenience” (De Varennes, 1997, p. 135).
But despite the ethnic frictions during the period
of obtaining independence, “the Macedonian state has
nonetheless been more inclusive in terms of its non-
Macedonian population than havemost other former Yu-
goslav republics since 1991” (Engström, 2002, p. 6).
One of the reasons for this is due to the multicul-
turalism and multilingualism that have been present
in Macedonia for some time. Macedonia had been a
part of Yugoslavia, which consisted of six republics (Ser-
bia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedo-
nia, and Montenegro) and had three official languages:
Serbo-Croatian, Slovenian, and Macedonian. According
to the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution, these three official
languages had equal status on a federal level, but in prac-
tice the Serbo-Croatian language was dominant in fed-
eral institutions. The Constitution also guaranteed the
right of national minorities to use their languages in of-
ficial communication. The Albanian and the Hungarian
languages were in official use in the two autonomous re-
gions in Serbia: Kosovo and Vojvodina.
In Macedonia, according to the 1974 Constitution,
theMacedonian languagewas official, and the languages
of ethnic minorities were in official use at local level in
the municipalities where the minorities were the ma-
jority or were in significant number. However, as a re-
sult of the wave of nationalism that was present before
the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the Constitution of Mace-
donia was amended in 1989 and limited the linguistic
rights of minorities, which led to ethnic frictions and the
widespread dissatisfaction of minorities in the process of
obtaining independence.
Since independence, Macedonia has been struggling
to reconcile the demands of the ethnic communitieswith
the need to be a unitary and indivisible country. In ful-
filling that aim in the past, intricate, prolific and some-
times unclear legal norms on the use of languages were
adopted. But despite all obstacles and doubts, foster-
ing the rights of ethnic communities is a permanent ten-
dency in Macedonian policies.
4. Accommodation of Multilingualism in Macedonia in
the Period 1991–2001
The 1991 Macedonian Constitution is characterized by
the “promotional” approach:
‘Promotionalmodels’ are found in states that are char-
acterized by a national majority but where national or
ethnic minorities are constitutionally recognized and
protected, and, thus, enjoy certain collective rights.
(Engl & Harzl, 2009, p. 311)
According to the 1991 Constitution of the Republic of
Macedonia, the Macedonian language, written using its
Cyrillic alphabet, is the official language of the Republic
of Macedonia. At the time, on the local level, there were
two possible situations for the designations of other lan-
guages as official. If some ethnic group was the major-
ity in some municipality, its language was also official.
If some ethnic group made up at least 20% of the in-
habitants of a municipality, the municipal council could
decide to use its language as the official language in
that municipality.
Besides this, cultural protection of minorities was
guaranteed, as was access to mass media in the minority
language, state support to cultural institutions in minor-
ity languages, and rights in education, which provided
the opportunity for linguisticminorities to educate them-
selves and maintain their identity. The public national ra-
dio and television channel, and public local media in mu-
nicipalities where the minorities constituted 20% of the
population, broadcasted programs inminority languages
for a set amount of time. The state also financed the pub-
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lication of one newspaper in Albanian and one in Turkish.
A national theatre of ethnic minorities in Skopje, which
offered Albanian and Turkish drama as well as some
cultural-artistic associations and groups, was financed by
the state budget.
The right to education in the language of minorities
was guaranteed in primary and secondary schools. In-
structions in the mother tongue have been recognized
as a successful approach for the inclusion of linguistic
minorities in the educational system, as well as for the
protection of their cultural heritage and identity. In prac-
tice, primary education was offered in Macedonian, Al-
banian, Turkish and Serbian, while in secondary schools
the languages of instruction wereMacedonian, Albanian
and Turkish. The reasons for organizing education in the
mother tongue of only these and not the other minori-
ties were due to the limited number of teachers and lim-
ited economic resources.
But Albanians in Macedonia also demanded higher
education in their language, as well as the state-funded
Faculty of Pedagogy in Albanian, with aims to “produce”
Albanian language-teachers for primary and secondary
schools. These demands for higher education in Alba-
nian were intensified after 1995 when the University of
Pristina was closed by Slobodan Milošević’s authoritar-
ian government. Some professors who lost their jobs
in Kosovo came to Macedonia and attempted to open
an Albanian language university in Mala Rečica, a vil-
lage near Tetovo. This university functioned illegally at
the beginning.
In 2000 the first university in the Albanian language—
the South East European University—was established
with assistance from OSCE (the Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe), the Council of Europe, and
the United States. The Macedonian Government sup-
ported this university by providing the location and grant-
ing the use of land. Today, this university is regarded
“as a model for multi-ethnic and multi-lingual higher
education in South East Europe” (Xhaferi & Ibrahimi,
2012, p. 674).
As explored, the first decade of Macedonian inde-
pendence was characterized by divisive debates on lan-
guage, especially minority-language education at univer-
sity level; the registering of names at birth in minority
languages; the use of topographical signs in a minority
language; introducing Albanian language in state admin-
istration, etc.
Jenny Engström (2002, p. 6) points out that in this
period:
Despite restrictions on the use of the Albanian lan-
guage in higher education and political bodies, as well
as de facto discrimination in employment, Albanians
in Macedonia have by and large enjoyed extensive
civil and political rights.
However, despite improvements in granting linguistic
rights in 2000, “violent conflict between Macedonian se-
curity forces and armed Albanian extremists in the coun-
try” (Brunnbauer, 2002, p. 2), or a “mini-war” as it is
called by Engström (2002, p. 11), began in Macedonia
in January 2001, and ended in August 2001 with the
Framework Agreement, which was signed by the lead-
ers of the two biggest political parties in Macedonia, the
leaders of the two political parties of the ethnic Albani-
ans in Macedonia, as well as by the envoys from the EU
and the United States, and the President of the Republic
of Macedonia.
The implementation of the Framework Agreement
needed constitutional and legislative changes. Hence,
constitutional amendments were adopted in 2001.
These amendments were followed by the adoption of
more than thirty new laws and amendments on over
thirty previous laws. Among the new adopted laws was
the law on the use of languages.
5. Linguistic Rights in Macedonia after 2001
Constitutional amendments after 2001 introducedmajor
changes in the official use of the languages of minority
communities. The circumstances in which the Constitu-
tion was amended influenced the quality and clarity of
new provisions addressing the issue of multilingualism,
which caused different interpretations during their statu-
tory regulation and everyday application.
The constitutional amendments make a difference
to Macedonian language as the official language in the
whole territory of the country, in the international rela-
tions of the Republic of Macedonia, and the official use
of other languages spoken by at least 20% of the popu-
lation. This threshold of 20% is fulfilled only by Albanian
language. The Constitution defines the use of the Alba-
nian language as official. Official, personal documents of
citizens speaking other official languages are issued in
that language, in addition to the Macedonian language.
Persons living in a unit of local self-government in
which at least 20% of the population speaks an offi-
cial language other than Macedonian may use that of-
ficial language to communicate with the regional office
of the central government. Such an office shall reply in
that language, in addition to Macedonian. Also, any per-
son may use any official language to communicate with
ministries, which shall reply in that language in addition
to Macedonian.
The Constitution also provides that in the state or-
gans, any official language other than Macedonian may
be used in accordance with the law. The provisions for
official use of languages were included in different laws
and in the special law for use of languages, adopted in
2008. The Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia “has
opened its doors” for the Albanian language. Members
of the Parliament and holders of public offices can speak
in Albanian in the plenary meetings of the Parliament
and during the work of the parliamentary commissions.
The MPs can also use Albanian while presiding over par-
liamentary commissions. The laws that were adopted in
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the Parliament are translated and published in the Offi-
cial Gazette of the Republic ofMacedonia inMacedonian
and Albanian language.
During the elections, all forms, ballot papers, and all
electoral material for the municipalities in which at least
20% of the citizens speak an official language different
from the Macedonian language were published in Mace-
donian and its Cyrillic alphabet, and in the other official
language which is spoken by at least 20% of the popu-
lation in the municipality and its corresponding alpha-
bet. The name and surname of the person submitting
the list of candidates, and the candidates of the elec-
tions printed on the ballot papers, are written in Mace-
donian and its alphabet as well as in the language and
alphabet of the community to which they belong. With
regard to the work of electoral commissions and elec-
toral committees during the administration of elections,
the municipalities in which at least 20% of the citizens
speak an official language different to Macedonian, be-
sides Macedonian language and its alphabet in official
use, was the language and alphabet of the community
with more than 20% of total number of the population
in that municipality.
The official use of languages ofminority communities
in judicial procedures is also provided. Albanians inMace-
donia, as participants in the criminal procedure, have the
right to use their language in all phases of the procedure.
The court would provide oral translation of the presen-
tation by the Albanian participant in the procedure and
of the documents and other written evidence. The court
would provide written translation of the written mate-
rial, which is of importance for the procedure or for the
defense of the personwho is accused. All other parties of
the court proceedings, witnesses and participants in the
procedure had the right to translation, free-of-charge, if
they did not understand or speak the language in which
the procedure is carried out in. The person participating
in the court procedure would be advised of the right to
translation. All pleadings and documents that are sent
to the court can be sent in the Macedonian and Alba-
nian language. If they are sent in Albanian language, they
would be translated by the court. All documents that are
sent to the parties of the proceedings (invitations, deci-
sions, etc.) that speak Albanian are sent in their language
in addition to the Macedonian language. Similar provi-
sions are included in the laws on civil procedures.
The law also contained obligation forMacedonian Ra-
dio Television (MRT) to broadcast one TV channel and
one radio channel in the Macedonian language, and one
TV and one radio channel in minority languages. This fur-
ther provides one channel on national TV inMacedonian,
one in Albanian, and one in other minority languages.
Minority languages are also used in addition to the
Macedonian language for the names of the streets,
squares, bridges and other types of infrastructure in the
municipalities in which they are official languages. Bilin-
gual signs have a considerable psychological and sym-
bolic importance. Language visibility takes the form of
bilingual signs: road and traffic signs, street names, des-
ignations of official buildings, and general information:
Language visibility is an important policy measure be-
cause its official use and the generalization of minor-
ity language visibility has powerful (re)legitimization
effect, which, in turn, impacts on people’s attitudes.
(Grin & Vallancourt, 1999, p. 18)
The education in mother tongue in primary, secondary
and university level is provided in the Macedonian and
Albanian language. The primary education is provided in
Macedonian, Albanian, Turkish, Serbian and Bosnian lan-
guages and secondary education in Macedonian, Alba-
nian and Serbian languages. Some of the schools provide
instructions in two or three languages (see Table 2).
At the local level, languages other than Macedonian
are official if they are spoken by at least 20% of the pop-
ulation. According to this, Albanian, Turkish, Roma and
Serbian are used as official languages. The local council
can decide whether languages spoken by less than 20%
of the population of a unit of local self-government can
be used as official.
The implementation of official languages in munic-
ipalities is not without difficulty. All municipalities in
which Albanians are in the majority successfully give ser-
vices in the Albanian language. But in some of them,
Macedonians complain that the demands and applica-
tions sent in the Macedonian language receive delayed
responses compared with the applications sent in Alba-
nian. Or, said in fewer words, local administration in
some municipalities with the Albanian population in the
majority is more inefficient when responding to applica-
tions in the Macedonian language. The situation is the
Table 2. Primary and secondary schools according to the language of instructions in 2015–2016.
Language Number of primary Number of pupils in Number of secondary Number of pupils in
schools primary schools schools secondary schools
Macedonian 725 119,550 98 54,858
Albanian 294 59,437 36 23,308
Turkish 64 5,591 12 1,574
Serbian 5 258 / /
Bosnian 3 283 / /
Source: State Statistical Office of the Republic of Macedonia (2017).
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opposite in some municipalities in which Macedonians
are the majority.
The municipality of Suto Orizari is a unique unit of
local self-government in which the majority of the popu-
lation are Roma and their language is one of the official
languages. It is also a unique municipality in which the
majority population doesn’t use their mother tongue in
communication with the municipality. The written com-
munication of the Roma populationwith the local admin-
istration is in theMacedonian language. Themain reason
for this is due to the fact that most of the people do not
know how to write in the Roma language because in pri-
mary (and secondary) schools they were educated in the
Macedonian language. The presumption that the compe-
tence level of speakers of the ethnic minority language is
one of the factors of its use in the official communication
can be proven in this municipality.
The reasons for improper implementation of legal
norms for official languages on local level are many:
deficit of finances for providing services in the language
of the minorities; lack of political understanding of the
need and priority to offer services in minority languages;
deficiency of demands for minority language use in con-
tact with the local government; and lack of political will.
6. Language Issues and Political Mobilization in
Macedonia
Since the independence of Macedonia, the implemen-
tation of linguistic rights in Macedonia has seen diffi-
cult negotiations and disputes. The analysis shows that
the “Ohrid Framework Agreement further developed the
constitutional and legal position of ethnic minorities in
Macedonia.” Macedonia has been given as an exam-
ple for particular cases of “internationally orchestrated
diversity-management efforts featuring the intensive in-
volvement of the international community” (Engl&Harzl,
2009, p. 333).
The public opinion on the Framework Agreement
was predominantly negative among Macedonian ethnic-
ities in the beginning, as some Macedonian politicians:
Consciously articulated and at the same time manip-
ulated widespread fears among ethnic Macedonians
about their national identity, which many saw threat-
ened by the terms of the Agreement. (Brunnbauer,
2002, p. 7)
The fear that the country’s future existence is “under
threat because the ‘real’ aims of the extremist Albani-
ans were not the acquisition of rights but territories” has
been raised (Brunnbauer, 2002, p. 8). These fears are fu-
eled by the demands of Albanians “to be considered the
second constitutive people of the Republic of Macedo-
nia.” They do not accept their “treatment as a minority”
(Brunnbauer, 2002, p. 13).
With time, the acceptance and support of the Frame-
work Agreement grew. But, despite that, nationalistic
rhetoric was present in the electoral campaigns of cer-
tain political parties (of Macedonians and Albanians) in
the period. In Macedonia, from 1991 until the last elec-
tions in 2016, political parties were divided on the ba-
sis of ethnic lines, i.e., the ethnicity dominated partisan
organizations. The Albanians in Macedonia were mainly
supporting political parties of ethnic Albanians. The inter-
ethnic mobilization in politics and civil society was weak.
The reasons for political mobilization on the basis of eth-
nicity are several. According to Choudhry:
[U]nderlying political competition over official-
language status is economic competition over public
sector employment, which fuels political mobilization
on the basis of language.” (Choudhry, 2009, p. 596)
We must keep in mind that “democratic nationhood is
composed of three key, independent elements: civil so-
ciety, the state and ethnicity” (Schöpflin, 2000, p. 35).
“[W]hen civil society and the state are weak, as they are
in Macedonia, ethnicity comes to dominate” (Engström,
2002, p. 18).
However, whatwas new for the elections of 2016was
that one of the major Macedonian political parties suc-
ceeded to mobilize ethnic Albanians and get their sup-
port in the elections.
A characteristic of the political system of Macedonia
is that from 1991, all governments were coalitional, in-
cluding at least one political party of ethnic Albanians,
which advocated mainly ethnic demands of the Albani-
ans in Macedonia. As a result of this, during negotiations
for governmental coalitions, ethnic issues were on the
agenda. As a result, the law on official use of languages
was adopted after the elections in 2008, and its changes
were adopted after the elections in 2011. After the elec-
tions in 2016, political parties of ethnic Albanians de-
manded new changes in the law regarding the use of lan-
guage in order to broaden the official use of their own
language. The public perception, however, is that some
of these demands for improving the status of the Alba-
nian language are not an instrument of pragmatic inten-
tions but a symbolic resource for political struggle and
an attempt to increase the Albanian’s political status in
Macedonia.
7. Conclusion
There are many “historical lessons” where we are taught
that the failure to properly respond to demands for im-
proving ethnic rights can increase conflict in the state and
can undermine social unity. Granting special rights to eth-
nic groups is necessary to enable their participation in
political and economic decision-making, in order to im-
plement substantive equality.
Unfortunately,Macedonia experienced these “histor-
ical lessons” on its own territory. Despite the fact that
from 1991 Macedonia chose the regime of linguistic pro-
motion, creating “positive” rights to key public services in
Social Inclusion, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 4, Pages 60–68 66
minority languages, this was not considered a sufficient
response to the demands of Albanian ethnic groups.
In the creation of language policy there is always con-
troversy and there is never consensus on appropriate
policies. Such experiences from developed democracies
add additional burdens to formulating linguistic policies
in Macedonia as a country in transition. The key charac-
teristic of the whole period, from independence to the
present, is that language policy in Macedonia has been
driven by the mistrust between ethnic groups and at the
same time, stimulated that mistrust.
This mistrust among ethnic groups has been fueled
by the political immaturity of most politicians who are
“locked in ethnic suites” and who intentionally obstruct
building inter-ethnic peace in order to manipulate their
electorate, keeping them in fear of the “enemies” from
other ethnic groups.
The legal provisions regulating the official use of lan-
guages in Macedonia were as a result of difficult nego-
tiations. Because of this, some of the provisions are un-
clear and open to different interpretations. In addition,
the lack of political will to ensure proper implementation
of the legal guarantees for use of all official languages on
both sides: from central government and local govern-
ment, and from ethnic Macedonian and ethnic Albanian
officials, additionally fuels the ethnic mistrust.
Macedonia needs mature political leadership with a
systematic approach to the accommodation of multilin-
gualism in the country, as well as a desire to build trustful
interethnic relations that are essential for the stability of
the country.
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